Discussion of Bradleys The Principles of Logic :: Bradley Principles Logic Essays

Discussion of Bradleys The Principles of logical system If I make the claim, A wolf is a mammal, I do not assert anything intimately my idea of a wolf, but sort of something general about this really class of beasts. For Bradley, to admit this is to admit that ideas are general barriers that tinct to an independent reality. But notice that if, faced with iodine of these actual canines, I then say Here is a wolf, each term of this singular judgment is itself general and cannot possibly hope to capture in its particularity and wealth of detail the animal in question. If ideas are incessantly general, then how can they relate to the real that presents itself as a unequalled event with determinate sensible content? They could just as tardily be describing any wolf and any here without an adequate snuff it or representation of sensory construe. These are Bradleys concerns in The Principles of Logic (PL)1, and since his proposed solutions to these problems were intended as a ref utation of Humes empiricist psychology and lingers doctrine of inference, and since they shaped if not antedated many of Russells achievements in logical theory, they call for careful attention.2I must note, however, that Bradley is particularly baffle insofar as he eschews any sustained metaphysical investigations, claiming that metaphysics is a matter separate from his logical concerns. Just at the point that one would demand a more determinate account, he remarks that to really use up such questions would involve him in metaphysics, which is not his present objective. However, as I hope to show, his entire theory of judgment rests on a understandably metaphysical consideration of the nature of time and space and, in fact, commits him to rather bizarre claims about the nature and function of singular judgments and indexicals. The notion that objects of experience are themselves symbolic will allow Bradley to unite his metaphysic with his theory of intentionality and at last fu nd those features of his account that are particularly relevant to our purposes viz., his anti-psychologism, from which naturally follows his fight on the impoverished apophantic paradigm in logic, his insistence on a distinction between logical and grammatical form, and his claim that all judgments, mighty understood, are hypothetical judgments. I. ReferenceWe must first gain an clutch for how pervasive the notion of reference is in Bradleys account. In this function I will first characterize the